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In the context of expanding TB and HIV epidemics in South Africa, the decision to enforce non-voluntary admission for XDR TB 
raises many ethical and human rights dilemmas, principally because it trades off the human rights of individuals against the public 
good. However, the dichotomy may also involve competing rights claims and rights obligations of the state to control infectious 
diseases. A more careful rights analysis is provided, using established analytical frameworks, to elicit the possible criteria that 
could justify limitation of individual rights. Generally, only in very restricted situations where there is a clearly defined risk to one 
or more third parties, based on evidence, and conditional on thorough consideration of available alternatives, could non-voluntary 
admission be considered. Community-based strategies will need to be developed to cope with infection control without forced 
admission for most cases. Even when compulsory admission is needed, strict adherence to administrative justice procedures 
would be required. Confinement has no place as a strategy for the broader control of an epidemic which should be contingent on 
improved health system functioning and addressing the abysmal investment in research and development for drugs for neglected 
diseases worldwide.
South Africa’s TB and HIV epidemics continue to confront 
health care providers and the country’s health system not 
only with enormous clinical and service delivery challenges, 
but also, more starkly in recent times, with a range of evolv-
ing ethical and human rights dilemmas. In particular, rising 
rates of both pulmonary and extrapulmonary TB, fuelled by a 
huge burden of HIV in the country,1,2 have seen growth in the 
caseload of multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB3 and the emergence 
of outbreaks of extremely drug-resistant (XDR) TB around the 
country,4-7 sometimes characterised in the popular press as the 
realisation of health workers’ ‘worst fears’.8
XDR TB, defined as resistance to at least the two most 
powerful first-line anti-TB drugs rifampicin and isoniazid, to any 
fluoroquinolone, and to one or more of the injectable drugs 
amikacin, kanamycin and capreomycin,9 has an extremely 
poor prognosis.10 Estimates of cure in XDR TB are specula-
tive (for example, Paul Nunn, coordinator of WHO’s TB drug-
resistance unit, cited a mortality rate of 80% for XDR TB11) 
and are certainly much lower than estimates for drug-sensitive 
TB (which in theory should be 85%), but cure rates in South 
Africa are approximately 50%12 or lower than for MDR TB.9,12 
Indeed, of the 53 XDR patients treated at Tugela Ferry in Kwa-
zulu-Natal province, all but one died in <4 weeks, prompting 
descriptions of incurability.13-16 Costs of treatment for MDR, and 
particularly XDR, are also prohibitive, often requiring treatment 
options that are complicated, difficult to administer and painful 
and carry high risks of side-effects. Treatment is typically far 
more prolonged and expensive, requiring admissions for peri-
ods of up to 2 years and costing approximately 300 times more 
than would be the case for drug-sensitive TB.12 Moreover, TB 
infection in HIV is associated with increased disease progres-
sion such that an increase in XDR-TB could be expected to 
significantly exacerbate the HIV/AIDS epidemic.11
The public health significance of XDR TB is therefore sub-
stantial, not just in terms of individual patient survival (‘a likely 
death sentence’14), and the potential harm to family members 
and close contacts, but also in terms of the risks of dissemi-
nation into the infectious pool in South Africa and the resulting 
added burden on the health system. For example, one health 
official is quoted as describing XDR as ‘biological warfare’ that 
carries the risk of ‘decimating the population’ if let loose.17 Put 
simply, an explosion of drug-resistant TB in the South African 
population, already rendered vulnerable by seroprevalences 
for HIV in excess of 30% among groups of reproductive age 
adults, looms like an uncontrollable and untreatable tidal wave 
that could wreak a scale of social and economic devastation 
never before anticipated. Such doomsday predictions are not 
just products of newspaper sensationalism;8,14,18 the prospects 
of disaster are also contained in sobering warnings (such as a 
‘ticking time bomb’) issued by a range of scientific sources.19-22
Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising 
that South Africa has seen the re-emergence of coercive pub-
lic health action (such as court orders) to enforce treatment 
and/or compulsory admission to hospital for XDR patients.12 
Such court actions have achieved a high press profile, attract-
ing national23,24 and international8,11,12,17,18 attention, including 
wildly misquoted statistics on the frequency of XDR cases,25 
claims of threats to millions of lives in Southern Africa26 and, 
for example, special health warnings issued to students com-
ing to South Africa27 on study-abroad programmes. Moreover, 
there have also been particular concerns over the violations of 
human rights inherent in coercive action. Unfortunately, much 
of the public media coverage has focused on the most sensa-
tional aspects of what is a complex dilemma,28 reducing the 
choices to a simplistic binary trade-off between the public good 
and individual patients’ human rights.
This article sets out why superficial analyses of the ethical 
and rights issues in managing drug-resistant TB patients are 
more likely to do harm than good, and argues for a more nu-
anced dialogue about these questions. In particular, it focuses 
on applying a human rights analysis that recognises the rights 
of individuals and collectives, and acknowledges the protec-
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tion of public health as not just a cogent social objective, but 
also as a very specific rights obligation of the state. This type 
of model makes it possible to explore when it is legitimate to 
limit individual human rights in the interest of the public good, 
clearly exemplified in the dilemmas around compulsory admis-
sion for XDR TB. However, using XDR as illustrative of the 
general case, it is first necessary to reflect on the nature of 
society’s approaches to health and also on what an XDR case 
implies for the health system.
Public health and the authoritarian  
tradition
The idea of quarantining patients with infectious disease is 
perhaps one of the most defining characteristics of the public 
health tradition,29 with deep roots in the hygiene movement30 in 
industrial Victorian England. Recognition of the transmission 
routes of contagious epidemics led early pioneers to establish 
the principles of separating the infected from non-infected as 
standard practice when facing such epidemics. Indeed, quar-
antining of sufferers of infectious diseases became the raison 
d’etre of many public health services, and was exported to Brit-
ish colonies through colonial health services staffed by enthu-
siastic doctors committed to the control of such epidemics.31 
Reliance on segregation as a health response to infectious 
diseases has been challenged in recent decades by the avail-
ability of treatment for many conditions that provide better and 
more effective alternatives to quarantine. Moreover, the HIV 
epidemic has particularly driven a realisation that protection of 
human rights may be necessary for good public health32 in that 
it promotes utilisation of health services and has the potential 
to improve treatment adherence, if health services are trusted 
and believed to protect patients’ rights.33,34
Notwithstanding these concessions to recognising the 
rights of affected persons and populations, public health prac-
tice draws heavily on a tradition of control and placing limits on 
personal autonomy, when seeking to address health problems 
from a population perspective. For example, almost all public 
health regulation involves placing limits on individual autono-
my in order to protect a public interest – in this case, the health 
of society.34 Implicit in such action is always a risk-benefit as-
sessment which inevitably requires judgments and draws on 
perceptions of risk.29
Not surprisingly, some critics have taken the position there-
fore that public health policies must be assumed to be violatory 
of human rights, unless proven otherwise.32 In that sense, the 
current debates on enforced hospitalisation for XDR TB21,35-38 
signal a key unresolved dilemma for public health: How is it 
possible to balance the public good against the protection of 
the rights of individuals infected with XDR TB?
What does XDR TB represent?
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the emergence 
of XDR represents essentially a failure of the health system 
to treat cases of TB effectively.12,35,38 Typically, XDR patients 
are individuals who have been treated for TB on multiple oc-
casions but with frequent defaulting or relapses, who may dis-
charge themselves from treatment when feeling better, thereby 
helping to encourage microbial resistance through partial treat-
ment, often on repeated occasions. Many, though not all, will 
be vulnerable, homeless, substance abusers or having other 
forms of social dysfunction. Dependence on social grants as 
the only family source of income might also have played a role 
in encouraging non-adherence because of reluctance to lose 
the grant when cured.39 The potential for stigmatisation of such 
patients is therefore high, since XDR infections are associated 
with problematic or ‘recalcitrant’ patients.29,40
However, it is also important to realise the systemic ante-
cedents to the emergence of XDR. One of the most important 
factors in maintaining good patient adherence has been dem-
onstrated to be the nature of the provider-patient relationship, 
and the quality of the treatment environment.41 Focusing only 
on patient characteristics, as is typically the case in XDR re-
search and in public policy, misses the context in which pa-
tients become non-adherent. Further, institutional deficiencies 
that may contribute critically to failure to counsel, treat or trace 
patients, may arise owing to unfilled posts, lack of staff, poor 
skill levels of existing staff, irregular or inappropriate drug sup-
ply, etc. Moreover, the neglect by pharmaceutical companies 
to research drug development for diseases such as malaria 
and TB, has left a legacy of limited options for treatment for pa-
tients who develop first- and second-line TB drug resistance.42
Therefore, in analysing whether a particular policy is justi-
fied, a human rights framework demands recognition of not 
just the immediate antecedents to a problem, but also the insti-
tutional and contextual factors underlying that problem.
What are human rights and what do they 
imply?
Human rights may be described as entitlements that people 
have by virtue of being human beings. Typically, they take the 
form of social or material claims from society that are universal 
across cultures and settings and are codified in national and 
international laws. They are by nature intended to address fun-
damental needs, and originated in concerns to protect people 
from an abusive state by limiting the power of the state over 
individuals. However, while dignity and freedom lie at the heart 
of a rights framework, and are manifested in a range of rights 
protecting civil and political freedoms (so-called first generation 
rights), it was recognised in the last century that entitlements to 
social and economic goods and services (so-called socio-eco-
nomic rights) are equally important; indeed, are indivisible from 
civil and political freedoms in that they are all interdependent. 
Exercising one’s right to access housing is essential for human 
dignity, and expressing one’s freedom to vote is not possible 
if one has not received sufficient education to be sufficiently 
literate to read the ballot paper, for example.
Having a human right therefore implies a duty on a third 
party – typically, the state – to deliver on that right. State obli-
gations take different forms: (i) The state must respect rights 
by desisting from passing laws that are, for example, discrimi-
natory against certain people or groups. Here, the obligation 
on the state is a negative one – to desist from certain actions: 
(ii) the state must protect people from violations perpetrated by 
third parties, such as it does with the many public health regu-
lations to protect people from environmental tobacco smoke or 
hazardous industrial pollutants etc; (iii) the state must promote 
rights by providing rights-holders with the information and 
mechanisms that enable them to realise their rights, otherwise 
rights remain on paper as theoretical entitlements that people 
do not use; and (iv) the state must fulfil rights by taking active 
steps – such as budgeting, and providing services and infra-
structure – to deliver on its rights obligations. Here, the obliga-
tion is a positive onus on the state to take specific actions.
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Rights often need to be balanced, since rights can conflict, 
either with each other, or different parties may have conflict-
ing rights. In the former case, it may be that a state action 
violates someone’s rights in the interest of meeting the state’s 
obligation to protect, promote or fulfil other rights. For example, 
implementing user fees at health facilities may have the effect 
of violating the rights of some poor people who cannot afford 
to pay, in order to achieve a more sustainable health system in 
the long term, and therefore help to realise the right to health 
for greater numbers of people. Similarly, fluoridating drinking 
water may violate individuals’ rights to choose43 in the interest 
of realising the right to health of the population as a whole.44 
Families whose religious and cultural beliefs eschew Western-
style allopathic medicine may find their rights to enjoy their cul-
ture violated if schools insist on their children being vaccinated 
before school entry, in the interests of protecting other school-
going children from exposure to various infectious diseases.45
In all the above examples, a rational basis for decision-mak-
ing is needed – one that balances the trade-offs in ways that are 
justified and justifiable. Human rights law addresses this need in 
three ways:
Firstly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) recognises circumstances under which rights 
may be validly restricted, i.e. situations where the restriction 
is to secure due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others; in the interests of general welfare; and in 
times of emergency (albeit that some rights, being non-deroga-
ble (such as freedom from torture, right to a fair trial, etc.) can 
never be restricted).
Secondly, the International Covenant on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) specifically obligates govern-
ment to take steps necessary for the prevention, treatment 
and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other dis-
eases. Here, far from being asked to abstain from doing the 
wrong thing (the obligation to respect rights), governments are 
expected to be active in doing the right thing (obligation to ful-
fil). What, then, if a statute restricts or violates an individual’s 
rights in order to allow the state to meet its obligation to fulfil 
rights, is the basis for deciding which rights imperative has pri-
ority? Some guidance to this question is found in the Siracusa 
principles, adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council 
in 1985, which identified criteria to be met before considering 
a rights limitation legitimate (Table I). In brief, these principles 
emphasise the need to confirm that an action that results in a 
rights limitation (e.g. compulsory incarceration) must be car-
ried out through a legal process that can be subjected to legal 
challenge, and has both an objective that is genuinely legiti-
mate and must also actually meet the objective it purports to 
accomplish, which is not achievable through alternative strate-
gies that are less invasive of human rights.
Thirdly, the application of the policy must contain sufficient 
checks and balances to ensure that it is not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory in its application.
Gostin and Mann47 developed this framework further into 
a tool to apply to health policies, to identify the rights impacts 
of health policies so as to inform decision-making around ap-
propriate policies. The framework poses a set of questions that 
need to be answered to assess the likely policy impacts (Table 
II). The purpose of such analyses would be to maximise the 
human rights and public health benefits within a policy, as lo-
cated in the top right-hand quadrant in Fig. 1. By setting out 
an explicit framework, the tool makes the assumptions behind 
value choices explicit, and forces the policymaker to seek evi-
dence to support claims. Where such evidence is not available, 
the tool allows one to test the robustness of the assumptions 
that have to be made in the absence of empirical evidence to 
support a claim.
TaBLe I. LegITImaTe LImITaTIons on human 
RIghTs
-    The restriction is provided for and carried out in 
terms of law.
-    The objective is legitimate.
-    The limitation is strictly necessary in a democratic 
society to achieve an objective.
-    There is no less intrusive and restrictive means 
available to achieve the same objective.
-    In its implementation, the limitation is not arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory.
Source: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1985
TaBLe II. a fRameWoRk foR anaLysIng The 
RIghTs ImPaCTs of PuBLIC heaLTh PoLICIes
1. Clarify the public health purpose.
2. Evaluate likely effectiveness.
3. Is the policy well-targeted?
4. Examine policy for HR burden (benefit?).
5. Least restrictive policy to achieve objective?
6. Base on significant risk standard.
7. Fair administrative procedures.
Source: Gostin and Mann, 1999
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Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the
Francois Xavier Bagnoud Centre for Health and Human Rights. (1999)
Fig. 1. A quality matrix: public health and human rights in health policy.
22 April 2008.
Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent So-
cieties and the Francois Xavier Bagnou  entre for H alth and Human 
Rights. (1999)
Fig. 1. A quality matrix: public health and human rights in 
health policy.
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Further adaptations of this model48,49 have extended this 
framework to looking beyond the classic limitations of civil and 
political rights in public health practice, into evaluating health 
policies’ socio-economic rights implications.
This paper now turns to an examination of the question of 
compulsory admission for XDR TB in South Africa, as outlined 
by Singh et al.,21 by which XDR TB patients who, after ade-
quate counselling about the importance of admission, refuse 
hospitalisation could be forced by judicial means to be admit-
ted to a suitable, prepared infection-control TB hospital.
Compulsory admission for XDR-TB
1. Public health purpose
The first step in the analysis is to clarify the public health pur-
pose of compulsory admission of patients with XDR TB. Four 
possible reasons can be advanced to justify holding patients 
against their will (Table III). To settle if these constitute legiti-
mate objectives in terms of the Siracusa principles, one needs 
to consider whether such objectives, independent of the meth-
ods chosen to reach them, provide a compelling public health 
rationale. For all but the last reason in Table III, we would have 
no argument about adopting policies that aim to prevent pa-
tients from infecting others, that limit the transmission of XDR 
in the population, and which improve adherence to treatment. 
We may express concern as to whether adopting public health 
policies solely to reassure the public that something is being 
done would, in and of itself, represent a legitimate public health 
action, unless it was effective in reducing a public health bur-
den. For example, banning imports of foreign meat products 
in the face of a public outcry against reports of food poisoning 
to assuage public opinion may have little effect on addressing 
a problem generated by poor regulatory control of domestic 
food hygiene. Indeed, it may exacerbate the problem in that 
markets for local production will probably expand. Without evi-
dence that a policy action has some effectiveness, a response 
solely on the basis of public opinion would be a weak and po-
tentially counter-effective action, providing a false sense of se-
curity and opening the door to discriminatory and stigmatising 
actions. This potential objective will not be considered further 
in the analysis that follows.
2. Probable effectiveness
The second step is to reflect on the effectiveness of the pro-
posed policy. Here, we need to draw as far as possible on data 
either from settings directly relevant to XDR or as analogy. 
Consider, then, the objective of limiting the spread of infection 
to others. So far as family members or close contacts in the 
community are concerned, removing infectious patients from 
contact will reduce the risk of infection. However, two issues 
then arise:
Firstly, such an action will almost certainly increase the 
risks of transmission in hospital to other patients and prob-
ably to health care providers. For example, the Tugela Ferry 
outbreak in KZN could clearly be linked to nosocomial trans-
mission, with 85% of patients showing similar strains of my-
cobacterium.5 The extent to which such risks of transmission 
within hospital can be reduced by hygiene measures is not 
entirely evident. While studies on the prevention of nosoco-
mial transmission of TB suggest that risks for patients may be 
halved, and for health workers reduced by up to 67%,50,51 it 
is well recognised that such benefits tend to be more evident 
in high-income countries.52 South Africa’s health system bat-
tles to cope with the demands of health care delivery and has 
a poor record of implementing infection control measures to 
reduce TB transmission in its facilities.12 Therefore, the wide-
spread belief that confinement of XDR patients would be likely 
to increase nosocomial transmission12,38 has considerable co-
gency. Moreover, an unintended consequence of such a policy 
is to turn the health worker into an agent of social control, with 
accordant effects on health worker morale. The sustainability 
of continued confinement of patients who are anxious to es-
TaBLe III. PoTenTIaL oBjeCTIves foR a PoLICy of InvoLunTaRy aDmIssIon foR XDR TB
Objective Public health cogency Likely effectiveness
1. Prevent patient infecting  Yes Limited effectiveness, contingent 
others (specific individuals   on hygiene measures in facilities. 
at risk)  Moreover, most transmission will 
  have occurred by the time patients   
  require admission. Only in specific   
  cases. Community-based alterna-  
  tives urgent and possible
2. Prevent transmission of  Yes Nil, given the scale of the TB 
XDR in population (systems   and HIV epidemic in South Africa 
level)
3. Ensure adherence with  Yes Questionable. Once XDR 
treatment, which may   positive, little prospect of cure 
contribute to (1) and (2)  
but not inevitably so
4. Respond to public  Not as a primary  Not considered 
concerns. objective
15         June 2008, Vol. 1, No. 1  SAJBL
     Article
cape and often abusive to their perceived captors7 is perhaps 
under-estimated by policy makers.
Secondly, patients with XDR TB will probably have infected 
their close contacts by the time they reach the diagnosis.12 Evi-
dence from other settings suggest high transmissibility in both 
community and hospital settings53 and clustering of genotypes. 
Given the poor case-finding record and late presentations in 
the South African TB programme,12 it is quite reasonable to 
infer that the burden of transmission would most likely already 
have occurred on presentation. For example, evidence from 
a study of TB patients in Ethiopia suggested that most of the 
delay to diagnosis is caused not by patient-related factors but 
by the health providers’ and health systems’ delays.54 Given 
that MDR TB has been shown to be no more infectious than 
drug-sensitive TB,55 it seems hard to make a case that XDR TB 
would transmit more readily.
Nonetheless, an argument may well be advanced that pro-
tection of family members may be achieved by removing the 
patient from the home setting. This will be effective inasmuch 
as family members are protected by appropriate barrier meth-
ods when visiting and patients are retained in facilities. How-
ever, as South Africa has seen, an unintended consequence 
of the policy has been frequent escapes of patients, requiring 
increased resourcing to keep admitted patients captive,7,12,56 
resources that could be better spent in strengthening basic TB 
infrastructure. Further, the need to keep patients admitted will 
fall away if treatment succeeds in rendering the patient non-
infective, since the objective of protecting third parties from in-
fection will no longer be served by compulsory admission.
It should be clear that the (third) objective of achieving pre-
vention at the population level through compulsory admission 
is implausible. Estimates of the prevalence of XDR in South 
Africa range widely from 2.1% of MDR isolates57 to 5.6%3 and 
even 10%,12 and it is evident that much of this burden in the 
population remains undiagnosed.12,28,38 Given South Africa’s 
huge TB caseload, the sheer volume of XDR patients would 
clearly exceed the capacity of TB facilities, already overbur-
dened and unable to admit XDR patients,6,39 no matter how 
quickly the Department of Health commits to building requi-
site facilities.58 Therefore, the probable lack of effectiveness of 
compulsory admission contributing to population-level control 
of XDR would negate reliance on this specific objective as a 
justification for compulsory admission in terms of the Siracusa 
principles. Indeed, one has to guard against allowing coercive 
practices to become ‘… a smokescreen for improved, but more 
complex or more costly public health responses to the root 
causes of tuberculosis control failures’.29
The third objective of relying on compulsory admission to 
achieve adequate adherence to treatment is predicated on the 
assumption that, once a patient is diagnosed with XDR TB, 
forced hospital admission will somehow improve adherence 
that has, in all likelihood, been extremely problematic in the 
past. Firstly, there is evidence that, independent of other risk 
factors, XDR TB will quadruple the risk of treatment failure, 
even compared with MDR TB.59 Secondly, where confinement 
has been used in the management of drug-resistance, it has 
been used as a last resort in a selected population,60 and suc-
cess rates associated with confinement have been variable 
and reported only for MDR TB and not for XDR, where ques-
tions remain as to its curability at all, even under optimal cir-
cumstances. Thirdly, the supposed success of the New York 
TB programme’s use of confinement was more to do with the 
‘credible threat of detention’ rather than its routine use.61 Fur-
ther, it is not clear that confinement for MDR TB has been any 
more effective than well-structured ambulatory care for pa-
tients with multiple drug resistance, where DOTS coupled with 
strong community engagement, training of community health 
workers and careful organisation has produced impressive 
outcomes.62,63 Lastly, use of confinement will in all likelihood 
deter some patients from seeking health care,12,34,38 thereby ex-
acerbating an existing epidemic. Using confinement to achieve 
better treatment outcomes therefore must be of questionable 
validity.
3. Suitably targeted
The third step in the model is to ask whether the policy is suit-
ably targeted. In other words, does it over- or under-include 
patients, and does it adequately distinguish risk situations?
Firstly, it has been pointed out that, by focusing on the rela-
tively smaller number of XDR patients who are the end result 
of a dysfunctional TB control programme, resources are inap-
propriately directed away from strengthening basic TB control 
infrastructure.12,28,38
Secondly, XDR patients affected by compulsory admis-
sion to date have been predominantly poor, working class and 
black. Is it conceivable that white patients or health care pro-
fessionals with XDR TB would be permitted to be treated on 
an ambulatory basis? If so, what distinguishes such patients 
and assessments of their likely compliance with infection con-
trol measures from their poorer counterparts? Implicit in health 
worker assessments of patient compliance are value judge-
ments coloured with sub-conscious or even conscious stereo-
types, thereby inclining to stigmatisation and discrimination.34
Thirdly, there is currently no apparent discussion in South 
Africa about what constitutes a significant domestic or work-
place risk and no data to inform such decisions. For example, 
are all infectious XDR TB patients equally likely to pose a risk 
to household residents, and is the risk the same for all con-
tacts? Current policy in the Western Cape distinguishes be-
tween immunocompromised contacts (i.e. mainly HIV positive) 
and others, which is some evidence of targeting. But the extent 
to which hygiene precautions could be taken at home, and their 
likely success, will vary greatly between households, depend-
ing on residential density, size of rooms, ventilation, quality of 
the structure, presence of outbuildings and other factors. For 
example, running a spaza shop or shebeen will clearly have 
implications for transmissibility, should the patient be treated 
on an ambulatory basis. These factors point to the need for a 
careful assessment on a case-by-case basis of the real risk 
of transmission to third parties, and consideration of whether 
ambulatory treatment is feasible. In the absence of such as-
sessment, the health policy risks over-including patients who 
could quite easily manage infection control at home, or those 
for whom domestic contacts can be adequately protected.
4. Human rights burdens and benefits
Regarding patients, the policy of involuntary admission ideally 
should only limit one right – that of patients’ freedom of move-
ment. However, experience in South Africa has indicated that 
the policy has the potential to, and frequently does, limit many 
other rights. For example, patients may have their rights to dig-
nity violated if conditions in the health facilities are sub-stand-
ard; rights to work violated if they lose their job or access to a 
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social security grant; rights to raise a family violated if they are 
forcibly separated from young children who have no alterna-
tive carer; and rights to housing violated should they lose their 
homes as a result of admission and suffer discrimination as a 
result of stigma.7,12,24,56 The extent to which these unintended 
consequences could result in inadvertent rights violations is 
dependent on the extent of resources invested by the state 
to put in place measures to respect, protect and fulfil patients’ 
human rights. For example, the state would need to ensure 
proper confinement facilities and conditions of confinement,7,56 
ongoing maintenance of income, and perhaps incentives to 
encourage compliance with hospital admission. These are not 
insubstantial costs,64 particularly as the XDR incidence esca-
lates. The argument that compulsory admission may provide 
increased access to health care for XDR patients would only 
apply if treatment options provided improved prognosis – a 
contingency not currently evident from the data. Whether the 
effects are positive or negative, it is imperative that decisions 
on compulsory admission are based on a full understanding of 
the complete picture of how patients’ rights are affected, sup-
ported by clear evidence.
With regard to third parties, protection from infection with a 
potentially incurable and life-threatening disease is obviously 
a key human rights benefit. However, inasmuch as the patient 
may be a breadwinner or parent, the burdens of loss of in-
come, housing, family integrity and stigmatisation may apply 
as much to the individuals whom the policy seeks to protect, 
and the amelioration of such effects is again dependent on the 
extent of resources accordingly provided by the state. Clearly, 
the state has obligations to take steps necessary for preven-
tion, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases (ICESCR article 12) and may be justified 
in limiting some rights in order to meet other rights. However, 
unless the protection of third parties’ rights and the state’s ob-
ligation to fulfil and protect rights outweighs the patients’ rights 
and the state’s obligations to respect rights, such a policy could 
not meet international human rights standards. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Point 6 below. However, a key step 
prior to this evaluation is the consideration of potential alterna-
tives to complulsory admission.
5. Less restrictive alternatives that achieve the same 
objective
From the perspective of preventing transmission to third par-
ties, home confinement has been suggested as a workable 
alternative, particularly if coupled with barrier measures and 
health services support.38 Evidence in the Western Cape points 
to successes with the use of lay health workers to enhance 
TB adherence among farm workers65 (a traditionally very dif-
ficult patient population), and excellent treatment outcomes for 
MDR TB were reported from Peru, using similar approaches 
involving community health workers.62 Médecins Sans Fron-
tières has similarly demonstrated the effectiveness of careful 
community-based protocols to maximise ARV adherence.66 
Similar kinds of intervention may work as well for implement-
ing infection control at home and the workplace to limit trans-
mission. Indeed, Goemare12,38 points out the contradiction that 
patients are trusted sufficiently to take ARV treatment at home, 
but are not trusted sufficiently to adhere to infection control 
at home. Extensive evidence points to the importance of the 
treatment environment and health system factors amenable to 
interventions41 as being key to enhancing TB treatment adher-
ence. Rather than ‘holding’ patients  in the literal sense of be-
ing incarcerated, we should interpret ‘holding’ as reflecting the 
process of providing support, containment and care needed to 
ensure overcoming the barriers to adherence.40
Clearly, this is not an all-or-none approach. Where there 
are immuno-compromised persons at home (or children), one 
may be less willing to risk domestic confinement and more like-
ly to choose hospitalisation. However, it is evident that such 
decisions must be on a case-by-case basis, on the best evi-
dence at hand, rather than being the result of a blanket policy 
that may undermine the ostensible objective.
From the perspective of prevention at a population level, it 
should be clear that a wide range of strategies provide alterna-
tives that are both more effective and less invasive of patients’ 
rights. These include improved management of drug-sensitive 
TB (especially at district level), building the capacity to man-
age drug-resistant TB outside of specialist centres, develop-
ment of laboratory capacity to effect prompt surveillance, im-
proved access to treatment for sexually transmitted infections 
and antiretroviral medications, where indicated, and health 
systems changes to effect these strategies. In addition, com-
munity-based interventions, raised community awareness and 
action, and adoption of social welfare policies that encourage 
adherence are all underlying steps that need to be taken.12
6. Significant risk standard
Given the above analysis, how do we judge the legitimacy of 
a decision to forcibly admit a patient to hospital? As an action 
towards decreasing disease transmission in the community, 
the analysis above clearly points to a rejection that this could 
constitute justification for compulsory admission. However, as 
a step needed in order to protect third parties, the assessment 
depends on the case assessment and specific evidence pro-
vided. Are there clearly defined risks to specific persons that 
cannot be addressed through alternative means of infection 
control? Such a process would reduce the number of cases 
from the general (XDR) to the specific (an XDR patient where 
a specific risk exists to a defined third party) and force us to 
look carefully at alternatives. Such approaches are widely ap-
plied in other settings,67-69 and the strict application of the re-
quirement to examine alternatives to justify involuntary admis-
sion has been shown to reduce the number of cases requiring 
court-mandated confinement.69 Therefore, one would expect 
the number of cases where such confinement meets the crite-
ria for legitimacy to be extremely few in number. Here, the is-
sue is directly focused on whether the magnitude of the risk, as 
defined as objectively as possible, is such as to justify admis-
sion, taking account of all positive and negative externalities.29
Where patients are not obviously infectious but are sus-
pected of converting, it would be a dangerous value judgement 
to forcibly admit them on the basis of a presumed anticipation 
of infectiousness. The unpredictability of risk requires as much 
effort as is reasonable to determine objective evidence of risk29 
rather than rely on assumptions vulnerable to stereotyping. 
Moreover, governments have the responsibility to ensure that 
research generates empirical evidence to inform decisions 
about the likelihood and extent of risks of, for example, do-
mestic transmission and the effectiveness of hygiene control 
measures.
A further consideration would be whether patients have 
been given full opportunity to exercise their responsibilities. 
Has the state done all that would be considered reasonable 
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in terms of counselling, information, and adequacy of service 
provision? If not, the health services are guilty of shifting re-
sponsibility onto the patient and adding a level of unfairness 
to the decision that may undermine the legitimacy of any legal 
action.34 As argued by the New York City Working Group, ‘It is 
unethical, illegal and bad public health policy to detain “non-
compliant” persons before making concerted efforts to address 
the numerous systemic deficiencies that make adherence to 
treatment virtually impossible’ (cited in Lerner67).
7. Fair administrative procedures
Lastly, in the event that a compulsory admission is deemed 
legitimate, public health policy has to meet the requirements 
for fair administrative procedures. This step implies that, for 
example, the procedure by which the decision was reached, 
allowed for adequate assessment of all necessary evidence. If 
a committee were responsible for making such a recommen-
dation, would it be considered to have the requisite skills to 
carefully assess the patient’s social background and the real 
risks of transmission to others, as well as the likelihood of non-
compliance with hygiene measures at home? In as many ways 
as possible, the policy needs to be structured to avoid any ar-
bitrariness.
Furthermore, safeguards need to be built into the process, 
such as, for example, a notice of detention given to the pa-
tients, legal representation and an opportunity for a hearing 
before admission so that factual inaccuracies that underlie the 
decision may be corrected. These provisions, frequently under 
the ambit of the court, would need to satisfy the requirement 
that review by an uninterested party is fair and transparent, 
and provide for re-review at time intervals that are realistic and 
protective of the patients’ rights. The policy would also need 
to guard against loopholes that allow discretion on the part of 
public officials to skip steps, as has been critically noted in the 
New York experience.67 In general, compulsory admission poli-
cies that comply with the Siracusa principles mandate public 
officials to exhaust all less restrictive measures before resort-
ing to compulsory admission.68,69
Additionally, family members, as the persons most likely 
to be the intended beneficiaries of a policy of compulsory ad-
mission, should be in a position to make inputs to the proc-
ess, perhaps through a patient advocate specifically for that 
purpose. Lastly, beside reviewing individual cases, monitoring 
and review of the whole process is essential to ensure that, for 
example, new developments in the science related to XDR, its 
transmission and its management can inform decisions around 
compulsory admission. Without such review, systematic bias in 
the application of the policy can give rise to discrimination that 
is hidden from the public eye.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has provided some pointers to making 
sense of the question of compulsory admission. Firstly, as a 
strategy for reducing risk to identified third parties, the public 
health purpose may be cogent but the effectiveness uncertain. 
Alternatives should be explored and, only in those specific 
cases where evidence of direct harm to third parties is demon-
strable and not possible to address by alternatives, could the 
relative balance of human rights burdens and benefits implying 
compulsory admission be considered. Even then, the process 
by which admission is implemented should provide sufficient 
administrative checks and balances to avoid unfair discrimi-
nation. To a large extent, current recommendations from the 
Medical Research Council70 provide guidance consistent with 
these principles and will hopefully serve to inform national 
practice in this regard.
In contrast, compulsory admission for purposes of effect-
ing treatment or as part of preventing population transmission 
must be considered ineffective and an unreasonable burden 
on the patient’s rights, especially in the presence of alternative 
strategies to reach these objectives.
However, one key aspect of the current discussion on XDR 
and compulsory admission that is frequently neglected is the 
recognition of the structural determinants in the global system 
of drug development that have created the phenomenon of 
neglected diseases. It is well recognised that the market econ-
omy has failed to foster research and development into those 
diseases suffered by the poorest populations in the world, who 
are unable to pay.42,71 This is as much a human rights violation 
as is any arbitrary confinement of XDR TB patients. Indeed, 
it could be said that accountability for human rights violations 
should not vest only with nations, who are being increasingly 
disempowered under globalisation, but also with transnational 
institutions, such as drug companies, whose practices and 
omissions have a huge impact on the survival of people in the 
poorest countries of the world.72
Therefore, inasmuch as the South African government fac-
es hard choices over enforcing hospitalisation of untreatable 
XDR patients to protect others’ health, they do so as a direct 
result of a global system of drug development that prioritises 
shareholder profits over public benefits, which has resulted in 
the absence of meaningful drug development for TB over the 
past 50 years. It would be an incomplete human rights analysis 
that did not link global injustice to the difficulties of preserving 
human dignity in the face of such reprehensible behaviour. For 
this reason, the obligations on governments to take positive 
measures to promote effective access to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, to protect this right from limitation by third parties, and to 
take measures to promote research and development of new 
and more effective pharmaceuticals73 acquires further cogency 
in the face of the unsavoury prospect of balancing individual 
human rights and the public good when facing the dilemmas 
posed in managing XDR TB today.
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